



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

MASTER THESIS IN
European Studies

The Nordics' fear of the Russian bear

The Nordics' threat perception of Russia's military capacity as
portrayed by media and the structural factors behind this picture

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24 May 2013

Abstract

Research has proved that structural factors influence how frequently certain issues are mentioned in media. However there has been no research on how structural factors influence a certain media picture, such as that of Russia's military capacity. Based on that Russia is the Nordics' significant other the aim of this thesis was to investigate the extent to which Russia's military capacity was perceived as a threat in the Nordic countries, as portrayed by media. The aim was further to test what structural factors impacted this media picture.

To achieve this aim a time-serious cross-sectional dataset was gathered. In addition to structural factors predicted to influence international relations this dataset included a measure of the media perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat. This threat measure was based on a content analysis of articles published in Nordic newspapers 2004-2012.

Russia's military capacity was pictured as mostly a small but to some extent clear threat in Nordic newspapers. Further statistical analyses showed that Denmark is the outlier with the lowest level of perceived threat. Sweden has the highest average threat perception followed by Finland. Norway ended up in between. This was in line with the conclusion regarding the structural factors which showed that, on average, the stronger the historical memory of Russia as an enemy, the more threatful is the media picture of Russia's military capacity. The result further indicated that, on average, the higher the trade with Russia is, the less threatful the media picture of Russia's military capacity is.

Keywords: The Nordic countries, Russia's military capacity, threat perceptions, media picture, structural determinants.

Word count: 14804

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1 Introduction

Through the centuries Russia has been both a friend and a threat to the Nordic countries. Russia constitutes the Nordics' significant other and its military capacity has in this role had a significant impact on the Nordic countries security policies (Rodin 2010, 121-126). This is illustrated by the intensive media debate that emerged earlier this year when the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces said in an interview that the military would only be able to defend the country for one week, in the face of a limited assault and if being warned beforehand. After that help from NATO would be needed (Holmström 2012). Russia was quick to show that it indeed was a threat, at least concerning musical heritage, through broadcasting a remake of ABBA's "Mamma Mia", suggesting that Sweden should either stick canons to SAAB cars or seek protection by Russia. The situation further shows how information about international relations is nowadays primarily mediated to people through the media (Fransson Sayuli, Elander and Lidskog 2011, 99; Johnsonn-Cartee 2005, 4).

Russia is quite busy with sticking canons to cars since it has more than doubled its military expenditure since 2004¹ (SIPRI Milex 2013) and is predicted to increase it with a further 50-100 percent the upcoming ten years (Vendil Pallin 2011, 163). This is a part of Russia's ongoing military reform which, with mixed success (Nichol 2011, 4-7), aims at turning the armed forces into a modern high-tech professional army. However even though Russia's military expenditure is the world's third largest it is only roughly a third of what it was in the end of the Soviet Union (SIPRI Milex 2013).

While increasing its military power Russia is also developing in an authoritarian direction as for example evidenced by its deteriorating Freedom House score. As a part of this development the use of anti-Western rhetoric is increasing (Hyodo and Vendil Pallin 2013). Meanwhile the West is due to financial problems scaling down its armed forces (Sipri 2013). These developments have led some intellectuals to talk about an emerging "New Cold-War" between Russia and the West (Lucas 2008, 18, 27, 269-270; Johansson 2008).

Rising tensions is of relevance for the Nordic countries since a map presented last year by the head of Russia's general staff showed that a significant part of the Nordics are within Russia's "sphere of responsibility"² (Storsjö 2013) which indicates that the Nordics' near abroad for

¹ In constant US dollars (2011). As share of Russia's GDP the increase of military expenditure is from 3,8 to 4,4 percent. (Sipri 2013)

² Makarov's map can be found in appendix A.

Russia is of increased geopolitical importance. The Baltic Sea is for example one of Russia's major export routes for gas and oil (Rodin 2010, 131) while the Baltic States have significant Russian speaking minorities. Both the 2008 Georgian war and Russia's strategy show that Russia will intervene if these minorities are perceived to be mistreated (Presidential decree 2009, §1 and §38).

Concerning the Nordic countries near abroad in the north, the conflicting territorial claims in the Arctic³ are getting increased attention as a result of the new economic possibilities the ice melting is opening up to (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 121; Granholm 2011, 263-265). The Arctic is for example predicted to contain 30 percent of the undiscovered natural gas in the world, which equals Russia's known reserves (Cohen, Szaszdi and Dolbow 2008). Russia therefore plans to increase its military presence in the area (Wezeman 2012, 8).

In sum, Russia is judged to be the only state in the Nordic countries near abroad that within a foreseeable future can cause security problems (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 120). Partly due to this the Nordic countries have in recent years deepened their defense cooperation and agreed upon the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity⁴. In light of these developments it is of increasing importance to understand how Russia's military capacity is perceived in the Nordic countries and what the systematic determinants behind this perception are.

2 Aim and research questions

This thesis aims to investigate to what extent Russia's military capacity⁵ is perceived as a threat in the Nordic countries⁶, as portrayed by the major Nordic media outlets between 2004 and 2012, and what the determinants of this media picture are. The focus is on the media picture since it is the main source of information for people in general and especially concerning international relations where people have limited personal experience (Fransson Sayuli, Elander and Lidskog 2011, 99). The newspaper readership in the Nordic countries is one of the highest in the world. Thus, the number of people claiming to read at least one newspaper a day ranges from about 80 per cent in Finland (Statistics Finland 2011), followed by 75 per cent in Sweden (Nord and Strömbäck 2012, 10) and 67 percent in Denmark, to 63

³ Map illustrating the overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic is found in appendix B.

⁴ The Nordic declaration on solidarity 2011 can be found in appendix C.

⁵ The notions of "Russia's military capacity as a threat" or "Russia as a threat" will be used interchangeably in this thesis. The focus will however remain on Russia's military capacity.

⁶ The countries studied are Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. Iceland is excluded.

per cent in Norway (Nordicom 2010). Furthermore, ‘a media picture’ contains not only the perceptions of journalists but also by academics, interest groups and citizens themselves. In other words, the perception of Russia by the Nordic media picture is more representative of the wider social perception than that of Nordic political parties or political institutions.

Based on this aim the following research questions have been formulated which will be further funneled down into more specific hypotheses.

- To what extent is Russia’s military capacity depicted as a threat in Nordic newspapers?
- Does this picture differ between the Nordic states?
- What are the structural factors behind this picture?

In the next section the literature on media pictures and the determinants of media perceptions will be examined, which will assist in formulating specific hypotheses.

3 Literature review

Presented below is an overview of the formation of media pictures. This boils down to the theoretical section about different structural factors expected to have impact on international relations as well as media pictures.

A media picture concerns what is reported about a certain subject, and how this is reported. These pictures are underpinned by both subjective and objective factors⁷ (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 2005, 12-13). A subjective approach regards the media picture as a social construction created by news promoters, news assemblers and news consumers (Johnson-Cartee 2005, 183). These groups can for example consist of politicians, journalists, editors, and the general audience (Asp 1986, 353-356). The interaction between these actors’ world views, interests and social backgrounds will construct the media picture (Falkheimer 2012, 159-160; Djerf-Pierre and Wiik 2012, 193; Johnson-Cartee 2005, 183-218; Riffe, Lacy and Fico 2005, 10). Some subjective factors are similar across the Nordic states such as for example a high level of journalistic professionalism (Nord and Strömbäck 2012, 78).

Objective factors, on micro level as well as on a structural macro level, have impact on media pictures. Factors on micro level can be the media company’s economic situation, the level of

⁷ Also called *Antecedent conditions* in the literature. For example in Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005).

competition on the market or the news agency's routines (Allern 2012, 244-250; Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 105-137). More revenue means more journalists and the ability to cover more stories, especially concerning specific foreign news such as Russia's military capacity. The newspapers political belonging also influences what the media picture looks like (Höjelid 1991, 114). Some objective factors on micro level are similar across the Nordic states such as having a well-developed mass press and Nordic wide media companies (Nord and Strömbäck 2012, 83).

On a macro level global economic, social and political structures influence the media content (Allern 2012, 244-250; Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 105-137). The use of this kind of structural factors and others such as national traits and interactions, called systemic determinants, to explain international news coverage is used by for example H. Denis Wu (2000 and 2003). Research about this is quite scarce compared to that of subjective or micro level factors and is often overlooked in textbooks about media content⁸. Wu examines if systemic determinants, for example trade, colonial ties and GDP, influence how much a certain country's media reports about another country. Wu finds that trade is the only systemic determinant that receives statistical significance across countries (Wu 2000; Wu 2003). However other research in the field such as Wilke, Heimprecht and Cohen (2012) concludes that for example history does matter. Further research such as Wang and Shoemaker has found that political freedom in China positively correlated both with the level of media coverage and the general attitude towards China in the US (Wang and Shoemaker 2011, 15). This means that the political factors also can be a part in shaping a media picture.

Research in this field tends to only address the frequencies of which countries are mentioned in the media. This thesis will take this approach one step further and see to what extent systemic determinants influence Nordic media pictures. In other words, it will be empirically analyzed if for example the volume of trade has impact on to what extent Russia's military capacity is described as a threat. Previous research has shown that the Nordic press description of Russia became more negative during Putin's second term as president and after the South Ossetia war in 2008 (Rodin 2010, 125-12; Splidsboel Hansen 2010, 181). However it has not been studied or explained to what extent Russia's military capacity is perceived as a threat.

⁸ For example in Shoemaker and Reese 1996.

This thesis will not focus on subjective or objective factors on micro level factors since the purpose is to use the media as a reflector of objective structures in international relations. The systematic determinants that will be used to investigate this are based on factors derived from the following theory section.

4 Theory

Structural determinants can be objective factors at macro level. Within the international relations field there are two dominant macro-level theories, each of which focus at different structural factors underpinning international relations. After a brief presentation of these theories the specific systematic determinants that are predicted to influence the Russo-Nordic relation are introduced.

4.1 Meta theories of international relations

According to realism global politics is a constant power struggle and a wish for survival. The fundament is that people are driven by self-interests and, according to neo-realists, that there is anarchy on a supranational level. This anarchic structure is characterized by suspicion and that states have to take care of themselves as well as to seek relative gains. However this situation must not end in conflict since a balance of power can emerge (Heywood 2011, 53-62). Factors such as military experiences and capacities are based on this of central importance in order to understand who, or what, is perceived as a threat.

Liberalism shares many of the realism's basic assumptions but emphasizes that lasting cooperation and peace is possible through economic interdependence and democratic peace (Heywood 2011, 61-65). For example well developed trade with Russia should result in a less threatful perception of it, while an undemocratic development in Russia should raise concern.

The Nordic countries foreign policies are different concerning the balance between realism and liberalism. Denmark and Finland are seen as the two extremes where Denmark's security policy has a cross-Atlantic orientation and is influenced by theories about complex interdependence and globalization. On the other hand Finland has a tradition of *realpolitik* based on having a deterring defense (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 11, 34, 120; Finnish government 2012,13; Salenius-Pasternak 2012) and self-censorship in order to never offend Russia (Salminen 1999, 5-7, 142; Doeser 2012, 171-172).

The next section presents different individual systemic determinants predicted to influence international relations as well as media pictures.

4.2 Structural determinants

Military capacity

Military power is a central aspect of international relations according to realists. Waltz claims that this remains true also in the post-Cold War world since states still are dependent on self-help and because military power is central to balance power in the emerging new multi-polar world order (Waltz 2000, 33-39).

Russia is going through a comprehensive military reform where huge assets are put on modernizing its military⁹. The expenditure on military material is for example planned to increase tenfold between 2011 and 2020 (Hakvåg, Hove and Sendstad 2012, 3-7). This has made it possible for President Putin to say that for example 2300 new tanks, 600 airplanes and 50 combat ships will be procured in the years to come (Putin 2012). This military buildup is planned to lead to an increased presence of its armed forces in the Nordic countries' near abroad (Rodin 2010, 128).

Russia's military capacity was what the Nordic countries, except Denmark in some cases (Ringsmose 2009, 90-91), used to scale their own defense ambitions after. This capacity constituted the background to Finland's appeasement policy and censored media (Salminen 1999, 5-7, 142; Doeser 2012, 171-172), NATO membership for Denmark (Jensen 1999, 653-657; Christiansson 2012, 216), secret NATO guarantees for Sweden (Holmström 2011, 27-35) and Norway's traditional deterrent and appeasement policy (Höjelid 1991, 131).

In today's context the Nordic declaration of Solidarity can be partly seen as a reaction to the authoritarian development in Russia whose military capacity has reappeared as a potential problem as a result of the war in Georgia 2008 (Agrell 2010, 231). However the position on Russia's military capacity also differs between the Nordic countries. Denmark's security policy does not describe Russia as a problem at all (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 22, 120) while Russia is still of great importance for Sweden's security (Tunberger and Blomqvist 2012, 27; Doeser 2010, 163). Nevertheless Sweden in its latest comprehensive security policy update described environmental changes, not Russia, as the biggest threat (Försvarsdepartementet 2007). Norway sees NATO as central to national security in its "asymmetrical neighborhood (Solberg 2009, 505) and Finland emphasizes the importance of a

⁹ 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, 20 new multi-purpose submarines, 1000 helicopters, 2000 self-propelled artillery vehicles are also planned to be procured (Putin 2012).

deterring territorial defense (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012, 34,120; Finnish government 2012, 13; Salonijs-Pasternak 2012).

Russia's military buildup has been elaborated upon by several authors (Hakvåg, Hove and Sendstad 2012; Johansson 2008; Lucas 2008; Nichol 2011; Vendil Pallin 2012 and 2013) but a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of this factor on the media picture of Russia's military capacity and the Russo-Nordic relations is missing in the literature. Based on Russia's role as the Nordics' significant other Russia's military expenditure constitute one of the two key independent variables.

History

The influence of history on international relations has been emphasized by theorists in the strategic culture discipline which see states' strategic considerations as being so deeply embedded in culture and history that they take a significant amount of time to change. The core of the strategic culture theory is that historical experiences shape states' interests and their use of military force (Neumann and Heikka 2005, 6-7). Research has shown that this is also the case for the Nordic countries (Howlet and Glenn 2005, 122).

That history can influence news content has been questioned by Wu (2000 and 2003)¹⁰ but confirmed by Højelid (1991), who in his dissertation concludes that history to some degree impacts the Nordic press picture of Russia. Further research about the Nordic countries shows how Finland's enemy perception of the USSR was influenced by historical experiences such as the memory of being a part of the Russian empire and from the hostilities during the Second World War (Luostarinen 1989, 130-134). For Sweden the perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat dates back hundreds of years and is based on numerous wars, not least the loss of Finland (Kahn 2009, 522-523; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001). Norway and Denmark are a little bit different since they are more oriented towards the West (Kolstø 1995, 3) and do not have the same collective memories of Russia as an enemy (Christiansson 2012, 203). Norway has for example never been in war with Russia, and Denmark's last war against Russia ended in 1583. Nevertheless both Norway and Denmark used to perceive the Soviet Union as a threat (Rowe and Hønneland 2010, 133-147; Jensen 1999, 653-657; Christiansson 2012, 216).

¹⁰ Wu does not use the wording *history* but measure former colonial ties.

That the Nordics' historical experiences influence strategic considerations has been confirmed (Howlet and Glenn 2005). However different researchers come to different conclusions regarding if history also can influence media content (Höjelid 1991; Wu 2000). This thesis therefore contributes to bring clarity in this area of research through conducting a systematic empirical analysis that quantifies historical memories in order to see if these have impact on the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

Trade

The liberal perspective in international relations' theory emphasizes how trade lowers the incentives for conflicts, even between countries with different political systems, since trade is seen as increasing interdependence (Haywood 2011, 62; Moravcsik 1992, 25-29). This correlation is confirmed by for example Polacheck and Seigle (2006) but counter argued by realists like Waltz (2000, 14-18).

Wu (2000, 126-127; 2003, 19) and Pietiläinen (2006) come to the conclusion that volume of trade is the single most important factor when explaining why certain countries are mentioned in another country's media, especially in a post-Cold war context. However they just show that well developed trade leads to that a country will be mentioned more often increases but they do not empirically analyze *how* it will be mentioned.

Literature about the Nordic states' relationship with Russia emphasize how for example an increased trade lead to that the enemy picture of the USSR was dismantled in Finland and pragmatic relations was developed (Loustarinen 1989, 131)¹¹. It is also the prospects of trade in its main export products, fish and fossil fuels, combined with Russia's military build-up in the High-North, that have made Norway invest significant resources in new military material (Wezeman 2012.)¹².

In sum, research on both global and national level indicates that increasing trade correlates with a lower perception of the trading partner as a threat (Polacheck and Seigle (2006; Loustarinen 1989), but a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of trade on the media picture of Russia's military capacity has not been carried out.

¹¹ Russia is Finland's biggest trading partner with around 14 per cent of the total trade. See appendix H.

¹² New combat vehicles for 10 billion, frigates for 20 billion and fighter planes for 60 billion Norwegian crowns (1 euro ≈ 7,5 nok) (Aftenposten 31 August 2006; Norway's ministry of defence 2012)

Democracy

The liberal theory within international relations claims that democracies rarely fight each other and that democratic political structures are essential for creating lasting peace (Moravcsik 1992, 17-21). This is supported by for example Rummel (1995) but argued against by others such as Walts (2000, 6-8).

In this way the, by realists emphasized, security dilemma does not exist between democratic states, but it is still present between democracies and authoritarian states. Risse-Kappen (1995) mentions how an authoritarian development within a state therefore will lead to that its armed forces is perceived as dangerous by democracies, notwithstanding if the state is really aggressive or not (Risse-Kappen 1995, 506-509). In other words, Russia's democratic development is an important determinant of its perception by others. This is in line with research about enemy pictures which show that the emergence of an enemy picture (a perception of a group as threat to the own security or values) in the media can be explained by both internal and external factors (Luostarinen 1989, 125-126).

Russia is developing in an authoritarian direction and some authors talks about an emerging "new Cold War" (Lucas 2008, 18, 27, 269-270; Johansson 2008) A similar point of view is put forward by the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) which describes how Russia since 2004 under the concept of "Sovereign democracy" has eroded political rights (Konnander 2008). However from a Russian point of view the western powers let Russia down during the 1990's (Rowe and Hønneland 2010, 142).

Russia's authoritarian development has been reported in Nordic media (Rodin 2010, 125-128; Splidsboel Hansen 2010, 181), but a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of this factor on the media picture of Russia's military capacity and on the Russo-Nordic relations is missing in the literature.

4.3 Theoretical predictions

The theoretical expectations are summarized in the following hypotheses:

H1: On average, the higher Russia's military expenditure is, the more threatful is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

H2: On average, the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the more threatful is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

H3: The effect of Russia's military expenditures on the media picture of Russia varies with history: the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the stronger the impact of Russia's military expenditures on the Nordic media picture of Russia as a threat.

H4: On average, the higher the trade with Russia is, the less threatful is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

H5: On average, the lower the Russia's level of democracy, the more threatful is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

5 Data and Methods

This section provides an overview of the data and methods employed to test the hypothesis.

5.1 Dependent variable

In order to capture the media picture of Russia's military capacity and test the hypotheses articles in major Nordic newspapers published between the years 2004 and 2012 that implicitly or explicitly mention this capacity have been used¹³. The articles come from two high-quality national daily newspapers per country, the biggest one produced in the capital and the biggest one produced outside of the capital. In most cases this selection constitutes the most influential newspapers in the country. For Finland only *Hufvudstadsbladet* has been used due to language considerations. Even if the whole Finnish media picture of Russia's military capacity is not captured this newspaper acts as a sort of international Finnish information channel where a Finnish view on different issues is communicated (Höjelid 1991, 126).

From the *Retriever* database a sample of five articles per newspaper/ year, altogether 293 pieces, was randomly selected. For some newspapers less than five articles per year were available. This indicates that five articles is a good coverage of the entire population and that the use of smaller local newspapers would be insufficient. A large number of newspaper articles further have the advantage to include more claim makers than a governmental policy document would. In the end quite few people actually read for example the annual foreign affairs declaration compared to the number of people who reads *about* it, and other issues regarding Russia, in the newspaper.

The time period, 2004-2012, is chosen because of Russia's military reform starting in 2003 and due to that Putin's second term as president began in 2004 which is usually seen as the

¹³ Information about the name, circulation and readership for each newspaper can be found in appendix D.

turning point towards a more authoritarian development. Russia's military expenditure has more than doubled since 2004 and its democracy score has decreased sharply. This period therefore constitute a formative phase for the relationship between the Nordic states and Russia. These kind of formative phases are in the literature described to be crucial to understand why certain threat perceptions emerge (Eriksson 2004, 194-202).

A quantitative content analysis is carried out on these articles in order to capture the Nordic media picture of Russia's military capacity. How Russia's military capacity is mentioned in these articles has been coded on a scale from 0 to 4 where zero equals no threat while four means that the article describes Russia's military capacity as an immediate threat to Nordic values or existence¹⁴. A five point scale makes it possible to see variation in how Russia's military capacity is described and to capture different nuances in the articles. A threatful perception can for example be hinted in a subtle way, be mentioned in a non-Nordic context, or be the main theme of the article. The result of this coding is transformed into a mean for each country and year which together forms the dependent variable.

When coding the level of threat in the articles it has been taken into account if Russia's military capacity was mentioned in a Nordic context, if Russia was promoted as an enemy, how the own defense capacity was described, if there was a pressure for Nordic politicians to take action as well as how the language, headlines and the theme of the article was structured. This is inspired by research about enemy images of Höjelijd (1991) and Ottosen (1993) as well as by McCombs (2006) concept of framing, J.W Tankard's suggestion about how to code a certain news picture¹⁵ and the guidelines to content analyze presented in Riffe et al (2005). Through using this quantitative approach it is possible to go through a large amount of articles. This makes it possible to see a clearer pattern than what would be possible for the "naked eye" alone. Even though the coding is based on guidelines from previous research there is room for subjectivity which can influence the reliability of the measure. Below are a couple of short coding examples.

Examples of coding

An article that was coded 0 (No threat) was *Försvarsanslaget kan minska drastiskt* published in Dagens Nyheter (SE) 2004/01/03. The article mentions that it is important for Sweden that

¹⁴ The author has a document in which the coding of each article is briefly explained. Can be handed out at request.

¹⁵ Tankard's list is mentioned in Johson-Cartee (2005, 73). All aspects of it have not been used.

Russia increases its military capacity as illustrated by the quote “*A military weak Russia has been preferred. But not any longer*”. It is further mentioned that this process is going too slowly and that Sweden should decrease its own defense spending.

A small or hinted threat, coded 1, was found in *Nasjonalistisk sikkerhet?* published in Aftenposten (NO), 2005/09/07. The article is a piece in a debate about if Norway should prioritize the military defense in the High-North or not. Russia’s military capacity is not the main theme in the article and Russia is mentioned as only one of several states with military activity in the High-North. However Russia’s military capacity is mentioned as something that do influence Norway’s policy, it is said in a Nordic context and Russia is hinted to be if not an enemy at least a potential problem as seen in the quote “*The Norwegian military’s presence is not aimed only against the Russians (...) but against all the actors in the northern areas to the same extent.*”. Based on this the article was coded 1, that it promoted a picture of Russia as a slight threat in the passing that might not have been obvious to the reader.

An example of an article that was coded 2, that a clear threat was expressed, was *Sikkerhedspolitikens geografiske krav* in Jyllands-Posten (DK), 2004/01/09. The author of the article argues for stronger national defense based on the increased geopolitical importance of the near abroad and because of Russia’s increasing unpredictability. The author claims that “*Conflicts with Russia can develop anytime in Denmark’s near abroad*” which should influence the national policy. However Russia’s military capacity is not the main theme of the article and only plays a limited role in the author’s argumentation.

A clearly manifested threat with a Nordic dimension, coded 3, was present in *Ökar Ryssland sin kapacitet i Östersjön?* Published in Hufvudstadsbladet (FI), 2009/12/06. The article’s main theme is how Russia increases its military presence in the Nordics’ near abroad which is manifested in the quote “*The Russian armed forces are clearly practicing for the upcoming struggle for the northern polar region’s natural wealth*”. Russia’s military is described as having offensive capabilities and it is mentioned how this will increase in the years to come. It is clearly mentioned that this offensive capacity increases the uncertainty regarding Russia’s ambitions in the Nordic near abroad. Russia is further promoted as the only security problem to the Nordic countries. The author clearly says that this should influence Finnish policy.

5.2 Independent variables

To answer the explanatory part of the research questions regarding what structural factors explains the Nordic media's position on Russia's military capacity the following independent variables have been developed. The theoretical background to them has been presented in the theory section.

Russia's military expenditure variable

The key independent variable in this analysis is Russia's military expenditure. Statistics about Russia's defense budget (in constant 2011 US dollars) from the *SIPRI database on military expenditure*¹⁶ has been used as a measure of its military capacity which constitutes the main independent variable. It could be measured in other ways, for example the number of soldiers or tanks in the Russian army. However such a measure would lack validity since it would not take into account the quality of the weaponry or how well trained the soldiers are which is of increasing importance in modern high-tech warfare.

History variable

Another key explanatory variable is collective historical memories (*History* in the regression tables). The historical facts behind the below presented measures are taken from the Swedish *Nationalencyklopedin* and *CIA factbook*.

In order to operationalize collective memories, every war between each Nordic country and Russia has been scored through a certain point system based on the number of decades since the war took place. Had a war taken place in 2012 that war would receive 100 points. For each of the ten first decades (<100 years) since the conflict the score decreases with 1 point per decade. To illustrate how memories fade over time the score has an escalating effect meaning that the following ten decades (100-199 years since the conflict) the conflict score decreases with 3 points per decade. For the next ten decades (200-299 years since the conflict) it decreases with 5 points per decade etc. This means that each conflict the last 32 decades (since 1693) will receive a positive score. All the wars before 1693 have been scored with 1 point.

For example Finland's Continuation War against the USSR which ended 69 years ago therefore receives 94 points (100 – number of decades multiplied with the escalating effect (6*1) = 94). The Great Northern War in which Sweden and Russia were on different sides

¹⁶ This data on Russia's military expenditure 2004-2012 is found in appendix E.

ended 291 years ago and was scored 15 points ($100 - \text{number of decades (29)} \text{ multiplied with the escalating effect } (10*1) + (10*3) + (9*5) = 85. 100 - 85 = 15 \text{ points.}$)

The *robustness check variable* of historical experience (*History_robustness* in the regression tables) of Russia as a foe was operationalized through taking the number of armed conflicts between the different Nordic states and Russia, divided by the number of years since the last war, and multiply this number with 100^{17} . The idea is that this index to some extent measures the past interaction (number of wars) with Russia and the devaluation time of collective memories (years since last war).

The indexes are somewhat biased since Finland and Norway have been independent much shorter time than Sweden and Denmark. Nevertheless the result of both the main history and robustness history indexes is in line with previous research which highlights that for example Norway and Denmark has limited collective memories of armed conflicts with Russia (Christiansson 2012, 203). Finland on the other hand fought the USSR not that long ago while the Swedish perception of the Russia as the arch-enemy dates back hundreds of years (Kahn 2009, 522-523; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001).

In the end, to create a measure of collective historic memory with high validity is hard and does not seem to have been done before. This is a first try at stepping up to that challenge.

Interaction variable

An interaction term between the key independent variables, Russia's military expenditure and history, is used to capture the conditionality of the Russia's military expenditures' effect on the dependent variable. Since previous research highlights how Russia's military capacity throughout history has had a significant impact on the Nordic countries (Rodin 2010, 121-126), it is reasonable to expect that the effect of predictor 1 (Russia's military expenditures) on the response variable y (Nordic media picture of Russia as a threat) depends on another predictor (the nature of historical experience).

Trade variable

The volume of trade between each Nordic country and Russia 2004-2012 is derived from *OECD* and *Statistics Sweden*. For each Nordic country the total import and export to Russia has been divided by the country's total global export and import. In this way a percentage is

¹⁷ Number of wars and when these conflicts took place is found in appendix F. For statistical computing reason Norway has been coded to have a value slightly bigger than zero.

achieved which shows how important Russia is as a trading partner for each Nordic country. Since the measurement is based on globally accessible and accepted statistics it has high reliability and acceptable validity.

Democracy variable

Russia's level of democracy 2004-2012 has been measured using Freedom House Imputed Polity Democracy score¹⁸, (published in the Quality of Governance institute at the University of Gothenburg 2012 standard dataset), which take into account civil liberties and political rights. This scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Freedom House democracy score is a widely used categorization that is open to the public, implying that it has high validity and reliability.

In sum, the dataset constructed as a result of the above mentioned efforts is a time-series cross sectional data set with 36 country/ year observation (2004-2012) and the above mentioned variables. It will be analyzed using appropriate statistical methods.

6 Analyses and results

This section begins with a presentation of to what extent Russia's military capacity is described as threat in Nordic newspapers. This descriptive phase is followed by an explanatory part where the impact of structural factors on the Nordic media picture is tested. The section concludes with a discussion of major findings.

6.1 The Nordic newspapers picture of Russia's military capacity as a threat

In order to answers the first two research question, "*to what extent is Russia's military capacity pictured as a threat in Nordic newspapers?*" and "*Does this picture differ between the Nordic states?*" the dependent variable of the study will be explored in detail.

As Table 1 shows the majority of the articles across the four Nordic countries, nearly 50 percent of the total, portray Russia as no threat at all. Almost 29 percent of articles in the researched sample of the Nordic newspapers describe Russia as a small threat. At the same time, 23 percent of articles portray Russia as a clear threat, including almost 7 percent that emphasize the Nordic dimension of the threat. Finally, none of the articles under consideration picture Russia as 'an immediate threat to Nordic values or existence'.

¹⁸ Russia's Freedom House Imputed Polity Democracy score 2004-2012 is found in appendix H.

Table 1: The Nordic newspaper articles mentioning Russia's military capacity categorized (%)					
	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden	Nordic total
not at all (0)	67.5	42.9	48.8	31.8	48.1 (140)
little / to some extent (1)	20.0	31.0	32.1	31.8	28.5 (83)
clear threat (2)	11.2	21.4	9.5	27.1	16.8 (49)
clear threat with Nordic dimension (3)	1.2	4.8	9.5	9.4	6.5 (19)
Immediate threat to Nordic values/ existence (4)	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100 (80)	100 (42)	100 (84)	100,0 (85)	100 (291)
Source: Authors calculation on articles published in major Nordic newspapers 2004-2012. Frequency of articles in parentheses.					

Table 1 also shows that the media picture of Russia's military capacity varies across Nordic countries. Thus, whilst more than two thirds of articles in the Danish media portray Russia as no threat, in Sweden this perception can be found only in about one thirds of the articles. In Norway about half of all coded articles depict Russia as no threat, and about 43 percent of relevant articles from the Finnish newspaper hold a similar view.

Table 1 further demonstrates that around one third of the articles in both Finland and Norway as well as in Sweden perceive Russia's military capacity as a small or hinted threat. In Denmark a fifth of the articles contain a similar picture.


According to table 1 a clear picture of Russia's military capacity as a threat is expressed in about a tenth of the Danish and Norwegian newspaper articles. A fifth of the articles in Finland have the same clear picture of Russia's military capacity as a threat and 27 percent of the Swedish articles have a similar view.

As can be observed in table 1 close to ten percent of the articles in Norway and Sweden holds a picture of Russia's military capacity as a clear threat with a Nordic dimension. In Finland close to five percent of the coded articles depict Russia as a clear threat with a Nordic dimension, only about 1 percent of the Danish articles holds a similar picture.

Finally table 1 shows that not a single article, in any of the Nordic countries, portrays Russia's military capacity as an immediate threat to the Nordics' existence or values.

Graph 1 presents the same data, allowing to observe the average level of perceived threat by country/ year.

Graph 1: The yearly average perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat in the Nordic countries newspapers 2004-2012. (Author's calculations)



The graph suggests that Denmark has the lowest average perception of threat regarding Russia's military capacity in eight out of nine years. The average fluctuates over time from 0 in year 2006 to 0.78 in year 2011.


According to graph 1 Sweden has the highest average perception of threat regarding Russia's military capacity in five out of nine years. The mean ranges from 0.56 in year 2010 to 1.5 in year 2005 and 2010.

The graph suggests that Finland's average perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat is quite stable over time with the exception of its lowest score 0.2 in 2006 and its highest 1.2 in 2005. Finland has the highest average in two out of nine years.

Norway's threat perception fluctuates greatly over time according to graph 1. The average perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat ranges from 0.38 in year 2006 to 1.3 in 2009 and 2011. Norway's has both the lowest level of perceived threat 0.56 in 2007 and the highest with 1.3 in both 2008 and 2010.

In sum, graph 1 shows that there is no clear pattern concerning the Nordic perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat under the period of study. However, simple frequency and graphical illustration are not enough to state that there is a meaningful difference in the perception of Russia as a threat between the Nordic countries. In order to establish means difference between groups an one-way ANOVA test was performed. It shows that there is a statistically significant mean difference between the countries ($F(3,32) = 7.512, p = .001$). As the data meets the assumptions of homogeneity and variance the Tukey's honestly significant difference test is used to determine where the differences occurred between groups. The Tukey's post-hoc test revealed that the mean threat of Denmark ($.453 \pm .264$) is to a statistically significant extent different from that of Sweden ($1.14 \pm .345, p = .000$) and Finland ($.889 \pm .284, p = .028$). The means difference between Norway ($.778 \pm .345$) and the other countries is not statistically significant. Neither was the one between Sweden and Finland. Graph 2 below depicts the means with 95% confidence intervals between Nordic countries.

Graph 2: The mean with CI of the Nordic media's perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat 2004-2012. (Author's calculations)



This section has reported to what extent Russia's military capacity is perceived as a threat in the Nordic newspapers, and how the level of threat differs between the Nordic countries. The frequency analysis (table 1) showed that Russia's military capacity was in about half of the analyzed articles promoted as a threat. Out of all articles this threat is mostly hinted or

mentioned in the passing (28.5 percent) but also portrayed as a clear threat (16.8 percent) and to a smaller extent mentioned as an clear threat with a Nordic dimension (6.5 percent).

A frequency table (Table 1), country/ year graph (Graph 1) and one-way ANOVA test was used to see if the extent to which Russia's military capacity was pictured as a threat differed between the Nordic countries.

The extent to which Russia's military capacity is pictured as a threat in Danish media is lower in all threat categories compared to the other countries. That Denmark has a lower average perception of threat ($.453 \pm .264$) in almost all the studied years compared to the other countries is illustrated in graph 1. The one-way ANOVA test showed that Denmark's threat mean was statistically significantly different from that of Finland and Sweden.

Sweden is the opposite of Denmark since it tends to have the highest, or close to highest, frequency in all the threat categories in table 1. Sweden's average threat perception fluctuated over time ($1.14 \pm .345$) but was the highest in five out of nine years. Sweden's mean threat perception was statistically significant different from Denmark's.

Finland has across the different threat categories in the frequency table (table 1) almost the same percentages as Sweden. Finland's average perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat is also, like Sweden's, statistically significant different from Denmark's. Finland's average threat is quite stable over time as illustrated both in graph 1 and by having the lowest standard deviation ($.889 \pm .284$).

Norway has the second lowest average threat ($.778 \pm .345$) which fluctuated significantly over time. Concerning mean differences Norway's was not different to a statistically significant extent from the other Nordic countries, illustrating that it forms a middle ground between Finland and Sweden with high threat means and Denmark's low one.

To conclude, Russia's military capacity was depicted as a threat to differing extents in the Nordic media 2004-2012. The perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat significantly differs between the Nordic countries. Factors underlying this dependent variable are tested in the following section.

6.2 Determinants of the Nordic media picture of Russia's military capacity as a threat

As a way of testing the hypotheses this section evaluates how well structural factors predict the extent to which Russia's military capacity is described as a threat in Nordic newspapers.

Given a limited nature of the time-series cross-section data the Prais-Winsten regression is used. Prais-Winsten regressions is a method of estimating a multiple linear regression model using exogenous independent variables and transforming the dataset to correct for serial correlation in the error terms. As a less conservative test (compared to for example fixed effects models) Prais-Winsten allows to investigate the change over time and across panels in datasets of limited nature. A particular strength of Prais-Winsten is that it provides sufficient controls for autocorrelation in the data (Alonso et al 2010).

Table 2 presents the result of the regression analysis. The main finding across the five models is the statistically significant effect in the predicted direction by the history and trade predictors.

Table 2: Estimated impact of structural factors on the level of threat concerning Russia's military capacity expressed in Nordic newspapers.

DV: Threat mean	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Russia's military expenditure	2.28 (4.54)	2.52 (3.94)	3.77 (3.53)	4.25 (6.23)	6.08 (7.14)
History		0.002*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	.01* (0.002)
Trade			-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.034* (.018)
Democracy				0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)
History*Russia's military expenditure					-2.15 (3.70)
Constant	0.66* (0.31)	0.46 (0.27)	0.41 (0.24)	0.33 (0.93)	0.21 .96
<i>N</i>	36	36	36	36	36
<i>rho</i>	0.24	0.11	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
<i>R</i> ²	0.01	0.21	0.35	0.35	0.36

Note: Estimates are based on panel corrected standard errors using Prais-Winsten regression. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Model 1: The first model shows to what extent Russia's military expenditure, which measures its military capacity, impacts the level of threat expressed in the Nordic states newspapers. Russia's military expenditure variable is not statistically significant. Since this is one of the main independent variables, with a strong theoretical background, it is included in Model 2 as well.

Model 2: In this model, the variable History that aims at capturing historical memories of Russia as a military threat is added to the equation. This history variable is significant at the 0.001 level and its impact is positive as predicted. That is, on average the more troublesome the history of Russia-Nordic relations the greater the current perception of Russia's military capacities as a threat. At the same time Russia's military expenditure is not statistically significant. These two variables explain about a one-fifth of the variation in the dependent variable. This is a considerable increase compared to Model 1, which can largely be attributed to the included History variable.

Model 3: In the third model the variable Trade, measuring the level of trade between the Nordic countries and Russia, is added to the equation. The Trade variable is significant at the 0.05 level and its impact is negative as predicted. This means that on average the higher the level of trade with Russia, the lower the perception of its military capacity as a threat. The History variable is like in Model 2 significant, this time at the 0.01 level. Russia's military expenditure is similar to the two previous models not statistically significant. These three variables explain around a third of the variation in the dependent variable. This is a substantial increase compared to Model 2 which can be attributed to the Trade variable.

Model 4: Democracy, capturing the level of democracy in Russia, is added to the equation in the fourth model. The democracy variable is not significant and it does not increase the R^2 compared to the previous model. This shows that the level of democracy does not influence the level of threat in Nordic newspapers. The effect of both History and Trade are robust to inclusion of the democracy variable. Russia's military expenditure is still not statistically significant.

Model 5: In the fifth model the interaction term between Russia's military expenditure and history has been added to the previously mentioned independent variables. This interaction term is not significant, and it only marginally improves the R^2 compared to Model 4. The effect of both History and Trade does not change when the interaction term is included.

Patterns in the determinants impact on the dependent variable

In the above presented table some patterns regarding the independent variables are found. Russia's military expenditure is not statistically significant in any of the five models it is included in. This remains true also under favorable conditions when it forms an interaction term together with history. In the first model where Russia's military expenditure is the only predictor the R^2 is very low ($R^2 = 0.01$) indicating that there is something within this variable that behaves differently from the dependent variable.

The effect of History is statistically significant and in the predicted direction in all models it is included in. This is interpreted as that history has an influence on the level of threat attributed to Russia's military capacity in Nordic newspapers, even when controlled for Russia's military expenditure, trade level, democracy score and the interaction term between the key two predictors. It means that the more troublesome the history, the more threatening the current perception of Russia. This finding is in line with the literature on Nordic-Russia relations which underscores the importance of the history between these actors of international relations. However the quantitative significance of this effect is difficult to assess due to the measurement of the variable ranges from 1 to around 187 across panels but stationary time-wise.

The effect of Trade is statistically significant and in the predicted direction in all models it is included in. The negative effect does only change to a limited extent across the models (from -0.04 in model 3 and 4, to -0.034 in model 5). The negative effect is in line with the predictions and implies that as trade with Russia increases, the perception of it as a threat decrease (when controlled for by Russia's military expenditure, democracy, history and the interaction term). The effect is however quite limited, meaning that as trade with Russia increase with one percent, the threat level on average decrease with 0.04 points.

The democracy variable, based on the Freedom House index, is not statistically significant in any of the models it is included in.

The interaction term between Russia's military expenditure and history is not statistically significant. This means that the effect of Russia's military expenditure on the dependent variable does not depend upon history. The lack of statistically significant effect for the interaction term gives further support to that Russia's military expenditure lacks explanatory power.

This first set of regressions indicates that two of the five hypotheses (H2 and H4) might be supported since history and trade is statistically significant in all models they are inserted in and their effect is in the predicted direction. That the final fifth model, where history and trade are statistically significant, explains 36 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is satisfying when taking into account that a media picture is also the result of subjective factors that have not been addressed in this thesis. However the result of this first set of regression is depending on the history variable which, as mentioned in the method section, has room for subjectivity. To capture collective memories numerically on country level in a way that is generally accepted way is hard. Even if the measure has a good reliability its validity is not of questioning. Based on this a robustness test will be run in order to validate the results.

Robustness check

In the previous section history and trade was found to have statistically significant influence on the level of threat expressed concerning Russia's military capacity in Nordic newspaper. The trade variable is based on official trade statistics and therefore has a high validity. This is not the case for the history variable which is based on the authors own calculations. In order to see if history really does influence the dependent variable a robustness test is conducted. Once again Prais-Winsten regressions and the same variables are used except that the variable called History_robustness replace the history variable used in the previous section.

Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis constituting the robustness check. History robustness is the only predictor to have explanatory power on the dependent variable.

Table 3: Robustness check on estimated impact of structural factors on the level of threat concerning Russia's military capacity expressed in Nordic newspapers.

DV: Threat mean	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Russia's military expenditure	2.28 (4.54)	3.05 (3.57)	3.33 (3.57)	3.73 (6.25)	6.04 (7.90)
History_robustness		0.11*** (0.03)	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	.20 (.14)
Trade			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Democracy				0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)
History*Russia's military expenditure					-1.16 2.14
Constant	0.66* (0.31)	0.40 (0.25)	0.40 (0.25)	0.33 (0.93)	0.18 0.98
<i>N</i>	36	36	36	36	36
<i>rho</i>	0.24	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02
<i>R</i> ²	0.011	0.30	0.32	0.32	0.34

Note: Estimates are based on panel corrected standard errors using Prais-Winsten regression. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Model 1: This is exactly the same equation as the first model in the previous regression table (Table 2) since the only difference between the regression tables is how the history variable is constructed. Like in the previous set of regressions, Russia's military expenditure variable is not statistically significant. In order to see if Russia's military expenditure has any explanatory power when the new history variable is used it will be inserted in the following models as well.

Model 2: In order to see if the findings from the previous regression table (Table 2) are robust a history variable based on another calculation is added to the equation in the second model. The History robustness variable is significant at the 0.001 level and its impact is positive as predicted. Precisely as for the previous History variable this means that on average the more violent the history with Russia the greater the current perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat. At the same time Russia's military expenditure is not statistically significant. These two variables explain close to a one-third of the variation in the dependent variable. This is a considerable increase compared to Model 1, which can essentially be attributed to the included History robustness variable.

Model 3: Trade is added to the equation in the third model. Trade was statistically significant in the previous set of regressions (Table 2) but this is not the case in this model. The History robustness variable is significant at the 0.01 level while Russia's military expenditure is still not significant. This model explains 32 percent of the variation in the dependent variable which is slightly higher than in Model 2.

Model 4: In the fourth model Democracy is added to the previously mentioned variables. The democracy variable is not significant and it does not increase the R^2 compared to the previous model. The history variables positive effect and its significance as well as the models r-square does not change when Democracy is added to the equation. Russia's military expenditure is still not statistically significant.

Model 5: In the fifth and last model the interaction term between Russian military expenditure and History robustness is added to the previously mentioned independent variables. This is based on that even though Russia's military expenditure has not been statistically significant in the previous models its effect on the dependent variable might depend on the effect of the history robustness variable. However this is not supported since this interaction term is not significant, and it only marginally improves the R^2 compared to Model 4. The statistically significant effect of History disappears meaning history is not robust to the inclusion of the interaction term.

Patterns in the robustness check

To robustness check will now be summed up and related to the previous findings in the first set of regressions (Table 2).

The variable measuring Russia's military expenditure is not statistically significant in any of the models, either in table 2 or 3, not even when Russia's military expenditure varies together with history in the interaction term. The low R^2 in the first model in both tables (Table 2 and 3) further suggest that there is something within this variable that behaves very different from the dependent variable. The Russian military expenditure predictor will therefore be further investigated in the discussion section.

In table 3 the History robustness variable is statistically significant in the predicted direction in all models it participates in except the fifth where it is neither statistically significant on its own or as an interaction term with Russia's military spending. This shows that History robustness has explanatory power on the dependent variable when controlled for by trade,

democracy and Russia's military expenditure. The history robustness predictor's effect in the predicted direction increases only slightly (from $b = 0.11$ to $b = 0.12$) across the models. This is a stronger effect than the previous history variable had. The stronger effect is supposedly due to the smaller scale of the robustness measure which ranges from 0.23 to 4.62. Taken together the robustness variable therefore confirms the influence of history from the first regression table (Table 2).

The trade variable is not statistically significant in any of the models it is included in. This is a difference from the first set of regressions (Table 2) in which trade was statistically significant in all models it participated in.

The democracy variable is not statistically significant in any of the models it is included in. This is the same result as from the first set of regressions (Table 2). This means that as Russia's level of democracy decreases, it is not possible to conclude that this has an effect of the level of threat expressed concerning Russia's military capacity in Nordic newspapers.

The interaction term between Russia's military expenditure and History robustness is not statistically significant. This means that the effect of Russia's military expenditure on the dependent variable does not depend upon history, irrespective of how history is measured. The lack of statistically significant effect for the interaction term gives further support to that Russia's military expenditure lacks observed effect on the level of threat regarding Russia's military capacity in Nordic newspapers.

In sum, the statistically significant effect of History robustness in the predicted direction is in line with the original history variable. The stability of the robustness measure is further strengthened by that the R^2 scores for both of the most statistically significant models in table 2 and table 3 are very similar. (Table 2: Model 5, $R^2 = .36$; Table 3, Model 4, $R^2 = .32$). Together the result of the two history variables confirm that the influence of history on the extent to which Russia's military capacity is pictured as a threat in Nordic media is robust. The results will in the following section be discussed and connected to the hypotheses.

6.3 Discussion of the results

This section discusses the empirical results from this study in relation to the research questions, hypotheses and previous research.

The media picture

By exploring the dependent variable, the extent to which Russia's military capacity was depicted as a threat in Nordic media between the years 2004 and 2012 it was possible to find out the answer for the first research questions: *To what extent is Russia's military capacity depicted as a threat in Nordic newspapers?*

The statistics (see Table 1) showed that more than half of the analyzed articles described Russia's military capacity as a threat. Based on this it is indeed possible to say that Russia's military capacity to some extent is pictured as a threat in Nordic media. This result further shows that the media picture of Russia's military capacity is of importance to investigate. The analysis also showed that Russia's military capacity is to none extent pictured as an immediate threat to the Nordics' existence, and only to a limited degree pictured as a clear threat with a Nordic dimension. This means that almost half of the coded articles (46 percent) end up in either of the categories "small/ hinted threat" or as "a clear threat obvious to the reader". Concerning to what extent Russia's military capacity is pictured as a threat it is therefore possible to conclude that, from an overarching perspective, Russia's military capacity is foremost pictured as a small threat in Nordic media, but also to some extent mentioned as a clear threat.

These confirms general findings of the literature (for example Rodin 2010; Splidsboel Hansen 2010; Rowe and Hønneland 2010; Oredsson 2003; Höjelid 1991). However it is important to mention that the findings of this research are contingent on the quality of the newspapers sample and measurement of the extent of the perception of Russia as a threat, which contains some amount of subjectivity.

Further reconnection to the literature will be made in the next section which answers the research questions regarding differences between the Nordic countries.

Differences between the Nordic countries

The result of looking deeper into the dependent variable further showed that there were differences between the Nordic states concerning to the extent of their media perceived Russia's military capacity as a threat. That the countries had different averages were indicated in the frequency table (Table 1), graphically illustrated (graph 1) and finally statistically confirmed in a one-way ANOVA test. These results makes it possible to conclude that, the extent to which Russia's military capacity is depicted as a threat differs between the Nordic


states. Namely, Denmark appeared to have the lowest average of the perceived threat. Sweden, followed by Finland, had the highest average threat which were statistically significant different from Denmark's. Norway ended up in between the Finnish-Swedish block and Denmark.

The fact that Denmark has the lowest average threat perception was to some extent expected since Denmark's security policy is the only one that does not describe Russia as a problem at all (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012). Even if previous research have not really measured and compared the different Nordic countries threat perceptions in a quantitative way it is no surprise that Norway has the second lowest average threat since the literature points out how Norway and Denmark are more oriented westwards than Sweden and Finland (Kolstø 1995). Meaning they are not gazing as much towards Russia as Sweden and Finland.

That Sweden has the highest average threat perception, higher than Finland, is a bit surprising. Nevertheless the literature pointed out how the perception of Russia as Sweden's arch enemy dates back hundreds of years (Kahn 2009; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001). That Finland has one of the highest threat perception of Russia's military capacity is not strange since this perceived threat is Finland's motivation to keep a strong deterring defense (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012; Finnish government 2012; Salenius-Pasternak 2012).

To conclude, there are differences between the Nordic countries regarding to what extent Russia's military capacity is perceived as a threat in the media. That there might also be a variance over time, with year 2006 being significantly lower than the other years was hinted in graph 1. That this is indeed the case is illustrated in graph 2 below.

Graph 3: The Nordic annual average of threat concerning Russia's military capacity with standard deviation (Author's calculation)



The graph suggests that the Nordic countries average threat concerning Russia's military capacity year 2006 (3 on the X scale) was indeed significantly lower than that of other years. This variation in the dependent variable can explain low explanatory powers of the models, as linear regression might not be the best fit for the model in which one of the key independent variables (Russia's military expenditure) is gradually increasing. In addition the fact that a media picture could be explained not only by structural factors but also by different subjective factors that are not addressed in this thesis, may stand behind the relatively low values of R^2 statistics through the analysis. Next section will answer how the dependent variable, the media picture of Russia's military capacity, was affected by the structural factors.

The hypotheses regarding the influence of structural determinants

The following section will answer the last research question regarding what the structural factors behind the media picture of Russia's military capacity are. It proceeds by evaluating five individual hypotheses derived from relevant theoretical literature on structural determinants in international relations.

Hypothesis 1: On average, the higher Russia's military expenditure is, the more threatening is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

Overall, the hypothesis does not find support in data. As is shown in all models of the two regression tables (Table 2 and 3) Russia's military expenditure was not statistically significant


in predicting the extent to which Russia's military capacity was pictured as a threat in the media.

These findings are not in line with previous research such as Waltz (2000) and Rodin (2010). Even if the literature emphasized that Russia's military capacity was what the Nordic countries used to scale their own defense ambitions after it also opened up for the opportunity that the Nordic countries traditionally might have perceived this capacity somewhat differently (Ringsmose 2009; Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012).

The differences between countries might be the reason for the expenditure variable's low R^2 (0.01) and lack of significance. Since Russia's military expenditure is one of the key variables this non-significant effect is further explored through looking at the relation between the threat level and Russia's military expenditure for each country.

The following graphs show how the relation between threat perception and Russia's military expenditure looks like for each country. It further shows how many of the observations for each country that falls inside the 95 per cent confidence interval which is a range of scores constructed such that the population mean will fall within this range in 95 percent of the samples. The main finding is that the correlation between level of threat expressed in media and Russia's military expenditure behaves differently for the Nordic countries.


Graph 4: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Denmark, 2004-2012.
(Author's calculations)



Denmark

Graph 4 shows that as Russia's military expenditure increases, the perception of it as a threat in Danish newspaper slightly decreases. However there are some outliers. This is to some extent in line with literature mentioning how Denmark's security policy, unlike those of the other Nordic countries, does not describe Russia as a problem at all (Christiansson, Westberg and Wiklund 2012).


Graph 5: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Norway, 2004-2012.
(Author's calculations)



Norway

Regarding Norway graph 5 shows that as Russia's military expenditure increases, the perception of it as a threat in Norwegian newspaper increase. An interpretation of this is that in the case of Norway Russia's military expenditure might actually have an impact on the level of threat expressed in media. Since the findings in this thesis is about averages, for all Nordic countries, the relationship in one-fourth of the data don't bear on the relationship for the whole data. Previous literature mentioned how Norway sees NATO as central to national security in its "asymmetrical neighborhood (Solberg 2009) and that it has made huge military investments (Aftenposten 31August 2006; Norway's Ministry of Defence 2012). Norway's asymmetrical neighborhood is the high-North where Norway has for the country vital interest in natural resources. As mentioned in the introduction Russia is planning to increase its military power in this area. This might be one factor behind the in graph 3 illustrated correlation.


Graph 6: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Finland, 2004-2012.
(Author's calculations)



Finland

Graph 6 shows that as Russia's military expenditure increases, the perception of it as a threat in Finnish newspapers does not change. One interpretation of this finding is that the Russian threat is so deeply embedded in Finnish culture that it will remain stable regardless of the level of Russia's military capacity. This interpretation would to some extent be in line with literature mentioning how Finland has a tradition of keeping a deterring defense. As mentioned in the methods section only one Finnish newspaper has been coded. With more newspapers and articles the picture might have been different.

Graph 7: Threat perception in newspapers by Military Spending Sweden, 2004-2012.
(Author's calculations)



Sweden

Regarding Sweden graph 7 shows that as Russia's military expenditure increases, the perception of it as a threat in Swedish newspapers more or less does not change. There are several outliers. No literature really provides any guidelines to why Sweden should not be sensitive to Russia's military expenditure. At least the non-changing threat picture is in line with the Swedish security policy for the studied period which described environmental changes, not Russia, as the main security threat to Sweden (Försvarsdepartementet 2007).

In sum, In Finland and Sweden the perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat does not change as Russia increases its military expenditures. In Denmark the perception of threat actually decreases as Russia's military expenditure increases. Norway is the only state that is sensitive to Russia's increased military spending. Norway's behavior indicates that even through the hypothesis regarding Russia's military expenditure is rejected in this thesis it does not necessary mean that this variable does not have any effect in other circumstances. The diverse correlation between Russia's military expenditure variable and the different Nordic states threat perceptions explain why the variable measuring Russia's military expenditure is

not statistically significant. That the Nordic countries would perceive Russia's military capacity differently had some support in previous literature.

To conclude, this thesis has contributed to research through conducting a systematic empirical analysis which shows that Russia's military expenditure does not have impact on the average level of threat expressed about Russia's military capacity in Nordic newspapers for the period 2004-2012.

Hypothesis 2: On average, the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the more threatening is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

Both the first set of regressions (Table 2) and the following robustness check (Table 3) show that hypothesis 2 is supported by the data since both versions of the history variable (History and History_robustness) are statistically significant and in the predicted direction.

The statistically significant influence of history confirms previous research in the strategic culture theory claiming that history influences international relations and the Nordic countries' interests (see for example Neumann and Heikka 2005; Howlett and Glenn 2005). The result also supports the research mentioning how Finland's (Luostarinen 1989) and Sweden's (Kahn 2009; Oredsson 2003; Burgman 2001) perception of Russia as a threat is based on historical experiences.

Regarding Norway and Denmark the literature mentioned that both countries used to perceive the USSR as threatening but that none of them had a historical collective memory of Russia as a threat (Rowe and Hønneland 2010; Jensen 1999; Christiansson 2012). Since both Denmark and Norway had been coded low on the history variables this thesis does not come to any other conclusions than those.

Previous research did not agree upon if the history can influence news content. The result in this study lends support to Højelid (1991) who claims that history can influence media pictures, while it does not confirm Wu (2000; 2003) findings that history has no influence on news content. This thesis has therefore to some extent contributed to bring clarity into this area of research even though further studies are needed. The thesis has also illustrated that it is possible to measure historical memories in a numerical way.

Hypothesis 3: The effect of Russia's military expenditures on the media picture of Russia varies with history: the stronger the historical experience of Russia as an enemy, the stronger

the impact of Russia's military expenditures on the Nordic media picture of Russia as a threat.

The hypothesis is not supported since the interaction term between Russia's military expenditure and history is not statistically significant in predicting the extent to which Russia's military capacity is pictured as a threat in the media in any of the models it is included in (Table 2, Model 5; Table 3, Model 5). As explained earlier in the discussion this is supposedly partly due to the differences between the countries in the variable capturing Russia's military expenditure.

That the effect of Russia's military expenditure on the extent to which Russia's military capacity is pictured as a threat depends on historical memories of Russia as an enemy has not been empirically tested in previous research. However such a claim was hinted throughout the literature which regarded Russia's military capacity and historical perception of Russia as an enemy as closely related (for example Rodin 2010). It is further a reasonable interaction from a realist perspective arguing that history should not be forgotten when today's threats are interpreted (Waltz 2000). These claims can very well be true during other circumstances than those addressed in this study.

Hypothesis 4: On average, the higher the trade with Russia is, the less threatful is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

Hypothesis 4 is partially supported. As the first set of regressions (Table 2) shows trade has a statically significant effect on the level of threat expressed about Russia's military capacity in Nordic media and this effect is in the predicted direction. However, in the second set of regressions (Table 3) where a robustness check on the history variable was conducted the trade variable was not statistically significant in any model.

On an overarching level this result strengthens the liberal assumption within international relations that high trade lowers incentives to conflict as argued by Polacheck and Seiglie (2006). Loustarinen (1989) claimed that high trade lead to that the enemy picture of the Soviet Union was dismantled in Finland, which is partly supported. The result shows that trade do decrease the perception of threat, but that Finland still have an enemy picture of Russia, at least in the media.

Concerning media content the result is in line with research by Wu (2000; 2003) and Pietiläinen (2006). However Wu and Pietiläinen only claimed that trade influence the extent to which a certain country is mentioned in the media. A conclusion and contribution of this thesis is therefore that the level of trade tend to be able to influence how a certain media picture is portrayed.

Hypothesis 5: On average, the lower the Russia's level of democracy, the more threatful is the media picture of Russia's military capacity.

The hypothesis is not supported. As is shown in all models in the two regression tables (Table 2 and 3) democracy was not statistically significant in predicting the extent to which Russia's military capacity was pictured as a threat in the media.

This is not in line with previous research. The liberal claim that democracy increases understanding and decreases hostilities (claimed by for example Rummel 1995) was not supported.

The result does not confirm Risse-Kappen (1995) findings that an authoritarian development within a state will lead to that its armed forces is perceived as dangerous by democracies. The result is further a bit surprising since some literature clearly describes Russia's authoritarian development as threatful (Lucas 2008; Johansson 2008; Konnander 2008). One of the reasons to why the democracy variable is not statistically significant can be the variation in the score which fluctuates rarely but drastically (can be observed in appendix H). It should also be remembered that this thesis is about Russia's military capacity, had articles mentioning some other aspect of the Russian society been coded, such as the rights for NGO's, the democracy variable might have had an observable effect. However the lack of significance for the democracy variable in combination with the significant effect of history can also be interpreted as that whatever level of democracy Russia has right now is dwarfed by the perception of its authoritarian history.

In sum, the contribution of this thesis is that a systematic empiric analysis shows that democracy does not tend to influence the level of threat expressed in Nordic media concerning Russia's military capacity.

7 Conclusion

Previous research investigated which structural factors influenced how frequently certain news issues were mentioned in media. However there had been no research on how structural factors affect a certain media picture, such as the one of Russia's military capacity. The aim of this thesis was to investigate the extent to which Russia's military capacity was perceived as a threat in the Nordic countries, as portrayed by major Nordic media outlets between 2004 and 2012, and to test what structural factors impacted this picture. To achieve these aims a time-serious cross-sectional dataset was gathered, which included a number of original data: namely a measure of media perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat and a couple of measures for a key independent variable 'History'.

Based on the quantitative analysis of the data, the conclusion this thesis has achieved is that Russia's military capacity is indeed pictured as a threat in Nordic newspaper 2004-2012. This capacity was pictured as mostly a small but to some extent also as a clear threat.

Further statistical analyses showed that the level of threat differs between the Nordic countries to a statistically significant extent. Denmark is the outlier with the lowest level of perceived threat. Sweden has the highest average of threat perception tightly followed by Finland. Norway ends up in between. This pattern was to some extent indicated by previous research.

Using Prais-Winsten regressions structural determinants were tested against the extent to which Russia's military capacity was expressed as a threat in the media. Based on these statistical analyses it is possible to conclude that Russia's military expenditure and Russia's level of democracy do not have any impact on the level of threat concerning Russia's military capacity that is expressed in the media.

However this thesis can conclude that two structural factors, history and trade, indeed can explain the extent to which Russia's military capacity is pictured as a threat in Nordic media. Two different original indexes measuring collective memory of Russia as a threat were developed, one for the main analysis and other for a robustness test. Statistical tests showed that both of these history measures had statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. This means that the stronger the historical memory of Russia as an enemy, the higher the perception of its military capacity as a threat.

The level of trade was in one of the two sets of regressions confirmed to be able to predict the extent to which Russia's military capacity was perceived as a threat. The conclusion from this

is that it is indicated that the higher the trade with Russia, as percentage of the Nordic country's total trade, the lower the perception of Russia's military capacity as a threat.

In sum, the result from this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the Nordic countries perception of Russia. The result further contributes to research through showing that the extent to which Russia's military capacity is pictured as a threat is due to historical memories and the level of trade. By coming to these results the thesis has shown that it is possible to measure historical memories numerically. In addition to this the thesis has shown that structural factors can influence how a certain media picture looks like.

Future research can continue this path through testing the data collected for the purpose of this thesis in different contexts or contribute to develop more sophisticated numerical measurements. This thesis was just a first step to investigate if structural factors in international relations can explain how issues are pictured in the media. Future research can continue on this underresearched area through testing if other media pictures also can be explained by structural factors in international relations.

If the result of this thesis can be said to have any policy implications it is that in international relations, as expressed by the media, the development of trade seems to be able to make a difference in dismantling a threat perception while historical collective memories linger.

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Coded articles

Coded articles in Nordic newspapers 2004-2012		
Newspaper (Country code)	Date	Title of article
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2004/01/09	Sikkerhedspolitikens geografiske krav
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2004/03/14	EU og Ruslands valg
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2004/03/23	Admiral: Russisk atomdrevet krigsskib kan eksplodere
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2004/05/11	Fredens Hav
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2004/08/05	Dansk deltagelse i raketskold kan påvirke våbenkapløb
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2005/07/08	Nyt sikkerhedsudstyr for 721 mio. til Forsvaret
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2005/08/08	Russisk krænkelse af finsk luftrum kræver forklaring
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2005/08/09	Rusland undskylder over for Finland

Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2006/02/12	Højspændt situation i Kaukasus
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2006/05/14	Russisk tilbagetrækning fra Georgien
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2006/07/03	Russisk fly på fototogt over Danmark
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2006/09/07	To dræbt af brand på russisk atomubåd
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2006/09/26	Dansk-russisk flådeøvelse efter Dagmar-begravelse
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2007/03/05	Havel: Russisk kritik af missilskjold er ligegyldig
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2007/03/19	Russisk modtræk mod USA's dominans
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2007/06/06	Polakkerne kræver direkte sikkerhedsgarantier fra USA for at lægge jord til et amerikansk missilskjold, der har provokeret Rusland.
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2007/08/07	Russiske fly kaster bombe i Georgien
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2007/09/14	Russisk fly krænker finsk luftrum
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2008/07/07	Medvedev advarer om missilskjold i Litauen
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2008/08/22	Rusland: Vi er ude af Georgien
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2008/09/06	Politikere: Hjemmeværnet skal afvæbnes
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2008/09/30	Politikere erkender behov for Rusland-strategi
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2008/10/12	Rusland tester langtrækkende missiler
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2009/02/09	Forslag om nordisk forsvar mod Rusland
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2009/03/25	Danske F-16 mødte russerne ud for Island
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2009/03/27	Rusland vil sende soldater til Nordpolen
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2009/06/29	Rusland øver sig i krig i Kaukasus
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2009/09/02	Klimaændringer fører til sammenstød i Arktis
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2010/03/04	Russisk missiltest fra ubåd
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2010/06/04	Arktisk oprustning på vej i mølposen
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2010/09/20	Piloter skyder sig ud af russisk jagerfly
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2010/11/19	Natos fremtid
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2010/11/20	Medvedev: Vi har storstilede planer
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2011/02/24	Militærindkøb for 3.500 mia. kr.
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2011/06/28	Rusland testede atommissil nær Finland
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2011/11/09	Briterne bakker op om klyngebomber
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2011/11/23	Rusland svarer igen på raketskjold
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2011/12/07	Raketskjold giver øst/vest-strid
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2012/02/21	Putin vil bruge 4.340 milliarder på forsvar
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2012/03/26	Nato er klar med første del af raketskjold
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2012/05/23	Rusland testede missilskjoldsraket
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2012/10/21	Russere har dræbt 49 militante i Nordkaukasus
Jyllands-Posten (DK)	2012/12/18	Rusland har sendt krigsskibe mod Syrien
Politiken (DK)	2004/02/25	Arabiske tolke en mangelvare
Politiken (DK)	2004/03/12	Danske F-16 til Baltikum
Politiken (DK)	2004/04/26	Per Stig: Russiske trusler betyder intet
Politiken (DK)	2004/08/09	Rusland siger undskyld til Finland
Politiken (DK)	2004/09/08	Rusland får friere hænder til angreb
Politiken (DK)	2004/09/19	Ti års fængsel til russisk soldat for drab på 18-årig - benådes efter et år.
Politiken (DK)	2005/03/21	Danskere melder general til politiet
Politiken (DK)	2005/08/04	Et våben, det er umuligt at bruge - undtagen politisk
Politiken (DK)	2005/08/08	Finland kræver forklaring på russiske krænkelser
Politiken (DK)	2005/08/24	Kina og Rusland viser tænder
Politiken (DK)	2006/01/17	Kriminalitet dræber russiske soldater
Politiken (DK)	2006/02/07	Mindst 80 drab om dagen i Rusland
Politiken (DK)	2006/07/03	Russerne på fototogt over Danmark
Politiken (DK)	2006/08/07	Russisk kritik af sanktioner mod våbensalg
Politiken (DK)	2007/08/09	Kina og Rusland udfører stor fælles militærøvelse
Politiken (DK)	2007/08/14	Flere russiske bombefly tæt på USA's grænser
Politiken (DK)	2007/08/17	Putin genopliver den Kolde Krigs flytogter
Politiken (DK)	2007/09/14	Russisk fly krænker finsk luftrum
Politiken (DK)	2008/02/22	Rusland truer med militær magt
Politiken (DK)	2008/06/21	Russiske spioner opererer i Norge

Politiken (DK)	2008/08/08	Ekspert: Rusland försvarar sine borgere
Politiken (DK)	2008/08/14	Krigen gör russerne stolte
Politiken (DK)	2008/08/15	Dansk ekspert: Ingen ny kold krig på vej
Politiken (DK)	2009/03/27	Rusland sender elitestyrke til Nordpolen
Politiken (DK)	2009/06/15	Danmark opruster i Arktis
Politiken (DK)	2009/09/18	Rusland dropper missiler tæt på Danmark
Politiken (DK)	2009/09/21	Rusland vil alligevel have missiler nær Danmark
Politiken (DK)	2009/10/18	Fogh: Nato og Rusland skal dele missiler
Politiken (DK)	2010/04/06	Grænser i Arktis skal trækkes hurtigt
Politiken (DK)	2010/06/10	Russerne dræber ti oprørere i Tjetjenien
Politiken (DK)	2010/09/20	Piloter skyder sig ud af russisk jagerfly
Politiken (DK)	2011/05/07	De nye koldkrigere sejler ind fra nord
Politiken (DK)	2011/07/02	Rusland sender 2.000 elitesoldater til Arktis
Politiken (DK)	2011/12/23	Rusland tester atommissiler
Politiken (DK)	2011/12/30	Brændende russisk atomubåd har stadig sømænd om bord
Politiken (DK)	2012/02/21	Putin vil bruge 4340 milliarder på forsvar
Politiken (DK)	2012/08/03	Rusland afviser: Vi sender ikke krigsskibe til Syrien
Politiken (DK)	2012/10/21	Russiske styrker dræber 49 militante
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2004/12/15	Utskott tonar ner Rysslandsproblem
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2004/12/28	BBC pressade Tuomioja
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2005/04/02	Anti-finsk pamflett i Ryssland
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2005/05/23	"Relationen till Ryssland vår ensak"
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2005/06/11	Hummandet om Nato
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2005/09/24	Finland hjälper Ryssland
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2005/12/23	Defensiv duo, offensiv sext
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2006/02/28	Ryssland rustar upp vid gränsen mot Finland
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2006/04/25	Ryskt slarv, igen
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2006/05/05	Ryssland beklagar
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2006/06/05	Norden står inför nya hot
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2006/11/18	Samövning med Ryssland diskuterades
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2007/05/31	Militärt samarbete naturligt för Norden
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2007/08/18	Ryska bombplan flyger som förr
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2007/08/26	gasledning Ryssland ska informera omvärlden
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2007/09/30	Utmaning Ryssland rustar upp men forskare ser inga omedelbara hot
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2007/10/03	Rysslands nya rustningsprogram
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2008/06/14	sverige Nordiskt samarbete betonas Försvaret ska bantas
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2008/07/19	Ryska marinen visar upp sig
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2008/08/12	Ingen hejd på Rysslands hämnd
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2008/09/05	Georgien Ryssland tog initiativet till kriget
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2008/12/13	Öva gärna för att skydda Östersjön
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2009/02/10	Nordiska jaktplan kan få ansvar för Islands luftrum redan 2010
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2009/05/26	Medvind blåser på Östersjön
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2009/07/03	"Gasledning innebär ryskt hot"
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2009/07/10	Hett rör rör upp känslorna kring Östersjön
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2009/12/06	Ökar Ryssland sin kapacitet i Östersjön?
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2010/03/03	Ryssland vill återupprätta sin prestige
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2010/04/13	Östanvinden blåser igen
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2010/07/23	Teorier ingen grund för Finlands försvar
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2010/08/20	Veteranpolitiker om Ryssland
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2010/08/20	Rysk björn med alltför ömma tår
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2011/01/28	Bara piskan biter inte
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2011/03/24	Ryssland är oberäkneligt
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2011/10/30	Wallin: Skäl att följa med upprustning i Ryssland
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2011/12/17	Ryssland är ingen fotnot för Finland

Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2011/12/27	Finlands alliansfrihet kan vara en fördel
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2012/01/20	Ryssland med i Nato?
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2012/03/27	Anfall är bästa försvar
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2012/07/01	Farväl till nedskärningarna i ryska armén
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2012/11/21	Övervakning ett försiktigt linjeskifte
Hufvudstadsbladet (FI)	2012/12/30	Nato spökar över Island
Aftenposten (NO)	2004/08/30	Russerne kommer: Katastrofeøvelse i nord
Aftenposten (NO)	2004/09/04	Det nye forsvaret - et feilslått milliardsluk?
Aftenposten (NO)	2004/09/11	Forsvaret av Norge skusles bort
Aftenposten (NO)	2004/10/11	Forsvarsreformen - et vågespill med vår sikkerhet
Aftenposten (NO)	2004/12/18	Kjempebom da marinen skulle imponere Putin
Aftenposten (NO)	2005/02/09	Når Forsvaret settes på hodet
Aftenposten (NO)	2005/03/07	Øver på krig mot terror Kjemper mot «røverbander»
Aftenposten (NO)	2005/05/02	Forsvarskritikere på ville veier
Aftenposten (NO)	2005/09/02	Nasjonalistisk sikkerhet?
Aftenposten (NO)	2005/10/19	Uværet hindret våpenmakt Norske soldater fløyet om bord i K/V «Tromsø»
Aftenposten (NO)	2006/01/13	Advarer mot Russland NATO preger finsk presidentvalg-innsjutt
Aftenposten (NO)	2006/03/14	Atombombens tid er ikke forbi
Aftenposten (NO)	2006/09/09	Russlands flåte i raskt forfall
Aftenposten (NO)	2006/10/16	Norsk ubåt i russisk bursdag
Aftenposten (NO)	2006/10/26	Russisk rakett skal ha styrtet i havet
Aftenposten (NO)	2007/01/09	Forsvaret styrkes i nord
Aftenposten (NO)	2007/02/14	Ukløkt å omtale Russland som en trussel, sier flaggkommandør
Aftenposten (NO)	2007/10/17	Ny kontakt med russiske bombefly
Aftenposten (NO)	2007/12/16	Den russiske isbjørn ikke i dvale
Aftenposten (NO)	2007/12/16	Moskva trapper opp på Svalbard
Aftenposten (NO)	2008/02/01	Forsvarssjefen tar feil
Aftenposten (NO)	2008/02/03	Forsvaret må nå styrkes
Aftenposten (NO)	2008/05/04	JSF ikke jagerfly
Aftenposten (NO)	2008/05/06	Vil selge norske raketter til Finland
Aftenposten (NO)	2008/05/11	Nytt lys over russisk felttog i Georgia
Aftenposten (NO)	2008/07/01	Russerne øver i Spent Kaukasus
Aftenposten (NO)	2008/07/10	Liten risiko for russisk angrep
Aftenposten (NO)	2009/02/06	Russland presser ut amerikanerne
Aftenposten (NO)	2009/03/25	NATOs norske utfordring
Aftenposten (NO)	2009/06/04	Vil fjerne verdens atomvåpen
Aftenposten (NO)	2010/03/04	Russisk-kinesisk maktkamp om sjøveien i Arktis
Aftenposten (NO)	2010/06/22	Stadig mer norsk spionasje
Aftenposten (NO)	2010/07/09	NATO på sidelinjen?
Aftenposten (NO)	2010/11/30	USA ignorerer Norges interesser på Svalbard
Aftenposten (NO)	2010/12/17	USA: Norge mer nervøs for Russland
Aftenposten (NO)	2011/01/07	«Norge har aldri følt de russiske krigsflyene som en trussel»
Aftenposten (NO)	2011/02/14	NATO ikke imponert av russisk forsvar
Aftenposten (NO)	2011/04/01	Viktig del av sikkerhetspolitikken
Aftenposten (NO)	2011/06/07	Forsvaret blir årelattet
Aftenposten (NO)	2011/12/27	Dette glemte forsvarssjefen
Aftenposten (NO)	2012/04/27	Norske offiserer skal trene hos russisk erkefiende
Aftenposten (NO)	2012/06/22	Rykter om russiske skip på vei
Aftenposten (NO)	2012/08/03	Putin vil gjenerobre verdens hav
Aftenposten (NO)	2012/08/08	En gave til dem som vil oppgradere forsvaret
Aftenposten (NO)	2012/08/25	Sikkerhet i nord er et felles ansvar
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2004/03/24	UTLAND NOTISER
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2004/07/01	UTLAND NOTISER
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2004/08/13	UTLAND NOTISER

Bergens Tidende (NO)	2004/10/16	Retssaken som rystet Russland
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2005/11/02	- Tsjetsjenia selv- stendig om ti år fakta/begrunnelsen
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2005/11/16	debatt "Drama" i nord
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2005/11/26	Hær i en annen verden
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2005/12/27	Brølende mus i høy sjø
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2006/10/01	Russland lar soldater bli stående i Georgia
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2006/12/01	DEBATT
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2006/12/14	DEBATT
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2007/05/14	"Departementet har gjort seg skyldig i en voldsom forsømmelse overfor sin
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2007/09/12	Russerne kommer
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2007/10/26	Alene om rakettskjoldskepsis
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2007/12/02	Avtalene faller
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2007/12/13	Vi må vokte nordveien
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2008/02/08	Flere land spionerer mot Norge
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2008/07/29	Minst 22 druknet i ukrainsk
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2008/08/10	Ekspert: - Viktig at krigen ikke sprer seg til Abkhasia
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2008/10/23	Sjefen for Norges operative
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2008/11/21	Refser russiske politikere
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2009/02/15	- Putin og Medvedev forvalter Stalins arv
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2009/05/06	Repetisjonsøvelse for den kalde krigen
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2009/08/05	Meningen med livet, eller NATO
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2009/08/12	- Raketter made in Russia
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2010/04/24	Trusselbildet er Russland
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2010/05/15	Får støtte fra forsvarsforsker
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2010/08/01	notisrigg
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2010/10/28	kronikk torsdag
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2010/12/17	Økt norsk frykt for Russland
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2011/02/12	Kranglet mens Russland kriget
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2011/02/13	Bjørnen sover ikke
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2011/02/14	Russerne kriger dårlig om natten
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2011/05/10	En thriller i gullgruven Arktis
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2011/07/07	Militær opptrapping i Arktis
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2012/05/25	Den kalde krigens gjenkomst
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2012/07/14	Sender våpen via Nordsjøen til Syria
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2012/08/26	Putin viser muskler i nord
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2012/09/17	Vår nasjonale sikkerhet er i fare
Bergens Tidende (NO)	2012/10/23	Europas mariner halvert; fakta Norges marinefartøyer
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2004/01/03	Försvarsanslaget kan minska drastiskt
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2004/01/17	"Nya nedskärningar väntar försvaret"
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2004/02/21	80 procent av männen gör värnplikten
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2004/03/29	Nya Natoländer stärker USA:s makt
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2004/04/01	Rysk amiral vill förstärka flottan
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2005/05/21	Ryskt militärflyg kränker Finland
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2005/05/25	Ryska soldater får öva på svensk mark
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2005/09/04	Ingen rubrik (inled: Den militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten, Must, är bland det)
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2005/10/08	Rätt att belöna kamp mot kärnvapen
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2005/11/14	Gasledningen ett militärt hot mot Sverige
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2005/11/15	Ge oss en ny säkerhetspolitik
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2006/01/21	Ryssland rustar upp vid Östersjön Svenska försvarsanalytiker ser med oro på
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2006/02/26	Försvaret startar utbildning i arabiska
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2006/10/03	Ryssland förvärrar konflikt med Georgien
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2006/11/16	Gasledning blåste in en fläkt av kalla kriget
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2007/02/15	Politiker vill ha kvar svensk försvarsinriktning
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2007/08/29	Sveket mot försvaret
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2007/09/07	Delade meningar om Sveriges hotbild

Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2007/10/12	Veckans fråga och svar
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2007/12/03	Odenberg försvarsdebattens ende förlorare
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2008/06/10	Gemensamma förband med Norge en lösning
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2008/08/10	Rysslands angrepp visar att FRA behövs
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2008/08/29	Exemplet Georgien. De vackra orden har tagit slut.
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2008/09/22	Strid då försvarets framtid avgörs
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2008/11/11	Lisa Bjurwald: Fel signal till Moskva.
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2009/01/19	ÖB vill ha nordiskt samarbete
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2009/01/20	Ansökan till Nato skjuts upp Finlands utrikesminister Stubb tror på
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2009/03/20	Försvar åt rätt håll
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2009/08/18	Rysk storövning planeras i Östersjön
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2009/12/19	Supermakter nedrustar i nytt avtal om kärnvapen
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2010/01/18	Vi behöver nyansera bilden av Ryssland
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2010/01/19	Tala klarspråk Sveriges försvars- och säkerhetspolitik har förändrat
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2010/01/22	Missiler kan hota kärnvapensamtal
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2010/07/12	Försvarets ledning delas upp
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2010/08/03	Alliansen: Inga mer pengar till försvaret
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2011/01/05	Ryskt fartygsköp rör upp känslor
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2011/03/07	Kronologi Nord stream av: Caspar Opitz
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2011/03/08	Gasläckan: Bekräftat auktoritärt Ryssland.
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2011/08/13	Putins imperiedrömmar hindrar Baltikums reformer
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2011/09/02	Norge militärövar med Ryssland
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2012/02/21	Putins vallöfte: Mer pengar till försvaret
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2012/07/09	”Moderaterna blundar för det nya hotet från öst”
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2012/07/22	Risken med ett öppet förhållande
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2012/08/04	”Det ser dystert ut för diplomatin
Dagens Nyheter (SE)	2012/09/04	”Rysk upprustning skärper hotet mot vårt närområde”
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2004/02/26	Satsa på internationella fredsinsatser Svenska freds: Sverige behöver inget invasionsförsvar
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2004/09/25	När offentlig retorik blir obehaglig
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2004/12/01	Estonia fraktade hemligt material
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2004/12/05	Ryssland rustar upp medan Sverige lägger ned
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2004/12/31	Och Europa fortsätter att stödja Putin
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2005/03/09	26-åring åtalad för spioneri
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2005/03/22	Krigsherren Sjamil Basajev- Rysslands fiende nummer ett
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2005/03/31	Lettlands president misstror Ryssland
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2005/05/21	Finländska politiker tonar ner ryska flygkränkningar
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2005/06/05	Ingen god granne i öster
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2006/10/08	Rysk journalist hittad mördad
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2006/10/12	Ryssland svår nöt för Sverige
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2006/11/15	Gasledning får svensk kritik
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2007/01/17	Ministern tar inte ställning
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2007/07/25	Vill vi kunna försvara oss?
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2007/08/29	Säg nej till gasledningen!
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2007/09/06	Avhoppet en mardröm för statsministern
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2007/11/27	Gasledning en allt hetare fråga
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2008/01/08	"Sverige stoppar inte gasledningen"
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2008/06/04	Vi måste kunna försvara Sverige
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2008/08/02	Ryskt jaktflyg irriterar Danmark
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2008/09/06	Ryssarnas utsikt: flaggskeppet i USA:s sjätte flotta
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2008/09/13	Rysslands militära kapacitet ingen överraskning för oss
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2009/01/20	Björklund vill ha starkare försvar
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2009/03/16	Kejsarens nya kläder
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2009/07/16	Danmark rustar för konflikter i Arktis
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2009/11/06	Regeringen alltför passiv i arbetet för nedrustning

Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2009/11/09	Förringa inte rysk styrke- demonstration
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2010/01/19	En bättre försvarsdebatt
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2010/02/08	Kapprustning i cyberrymden
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2010/05/21	Försvaret splittrar regeringen
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2010/09/17	Mona Sahlin (S) Så klarade sig partiledarna i studion
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2011/05/14	Norra ishavet het fråga
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2011/10/06	Maktspel sinkar sanktioner
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2011/12/09	Nato - Ryssland osams om robotsköld
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2012/06/03	Tre storheter styr ryssarnas liv
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2012/06/08	Rysk kritik väcker finsk irritation
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2012/08/03	Rysk vinter närmar sig
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2012/10/01	En modernare försvarsdebatt
Göteborgs-Posten (SE)	2012/12/07	Grönt ljus för Jas i riksdagen

Appendices

A. Makarov's map



genhauerin mukaan on täysin selvää, että Makarovin kommentit edustavat Venäjän ylimmän poliittisen johdon linjaa.

"Tietysti! Makarov puhui asevoimien komentajana, ei yksityishenkilönä."

FELGENHAUER nostaa puheen merkittävimmäksi viestiksi kohdan, jossa Makarov moittii Suomen armeijaa toiminnasta lähellä itärajaa ja "Idäksi" nimettyjä sotaharjoituksia.

"Herää kysymys, ketä vastaan ja miksi harjoitus pidetään", Makarov sanoi puheessaan.

Makarov liitti armeijan toiminnan itärajalla – hieman yllättäen – Venäjän eteläisen naapurin Georgian tukemiseen.

"Otaen huomioon Georgian politiikan Venäjä-vastaisuuden ja sen kostopyrkimykset Abhasiaa ja Etelä-Ossetiaa kohtaan, Suomen puolustusvoimien kyseiset toimet eivät vastaa yhteisiä tavoitteitamme kehittää kahdenvälistä yhteistyötä", hän sanoi.

lan prikaa rannikkop meen.

Felgenh kommenti koministe seen lausi tetään YH nisteriä H

Venäjän tämänviik orgiassa o vallat ei c Georgian tonin tuk

Saakašvili kostamaan kuussa 20


"Lausun va. On ole riski uude jän ja Ge genhauer

VENÄLÄIS vin puhe suurta kii

Radioas nosti u kommenti taa Nator den takaa Pietarila

B. Overlapping claims in the Arctic

Map available at < <http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/04/11/cooperation-not-conflict-in-the-arctic/> > [Accessed 10 May 2013]



C. The Nordic declaration on solidarity, 5 April 2011

“The Ministers emphasized a strong community of values between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Efforts to promote democracy, international law including human rights, gender equality and sustainable development are integral parts of the foreign policy of the Nordic countries. On the basis of common interest and geographical proximity it is natural for the Nordic countries to cooperate in meeting the challenges in the area of foreign and security policy in a spirit of solidarity. In this context Ministers discussed potential risks inter alia natural and man-made disasters, cyber and terrorist attacks. Should a Nordic country be affected, the others will, upon request from that country, assist with relevant means. The intensified Nordic cooperation will be undertaken fully in line with each country’s security and defense policy and complement existing European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation.”

(Available at Finland’s ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage:
<http://www.formin.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=217312>)

D. Statistics about the analyzed newspapers

Table A1: Statistics about the analyzed newspapers			
	Daily circulation	Daily readership	Owner
Sweden			
Dagens Nyheter	292 300	858 000	Bonnier
Göteborgs-Posten	227 200	541 000	Stampen AB
Norway			
Aftenposten	239 831	663 000	Scibsted ASA
Bergens Tidende	82 432	232 000	Schibsted ASA
Denmark			
Jyllands-Posten	106 717	400 000	JP/ Politikens Hus A/S
Politiken	97 986	368 000	JP/ Politikens Hus A/S
Finland			
Hufvudstadsbladet	50 000	100 000	Konstsamfundet
Source: Nordic information Centre for Media and Communication research (Nordicom), <i>Newspaper readership, daily reach of paper version</i> , 2010.			

E. Data on Russia's military expenditure

Table A2: Russia's military expenditure 2004-2012

Year	In constant (2011) US\$ millions.
2004	44379
2005	50505
2006	56417
2007	61824
2008	67986
2009	71566
2010	72918
2011	78330
2012	90646
Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012.	

F. The Nordic countries historical interaction with Russia as of 2012

Facts such as of year 2012 derived from the Swedish *Nationalencyklopedin* and *CIA factbook*.

- Sweden: Independent 1523. 9 wars with Russia, 203 years since the last one. (The Finnish War 1808–1809; Gustav III's Russian war 1788-1790; The Hats' Russian war 1741–1743; Great Northern war 1700-1721; Karl X Russian war 1656-1661; Ingrian War 1610-1617; The Nordic 25 years war 1570-1595; Livonian War 1558-1583; The great Russian War 1554-1557)
- Finland: Independent 1917. 2 wars with Russia, 68 years since the last one. (The Continuation war 1941-44; The Winter War 1939-1940)
- Denmark: Independent 965. 1 war with Russia, 429 years since the last one (Livonian War 1558-1583).
- Norway: Independent 1905. No wars with Russia.

G. The Nordic countries trade with Russia

Table A3: The Nordic countries trade with Russia 2004-2012

Country/ year	Trade with RU as % of total trade
Denmark 2004	1,267
Denmark 2005	1,424
Denmark 2006	1,544
Denmark 2007	1,457
Denmark 2008	1,614
Denmark 2009	1,105
Denmark 2010	1,381
Denmark 2011	1,854
Denmark 2012	1,5
Finland 2004	10,735
Finland 2005	12,283
Finland 2006	11,905
Finland 2007	11,992
Finland 2008	13,803
Finland 2009	12,385
Finland 2010	13,2
Finland 2011	13,89
Finland 2012	14,03
Norway 2004	1,262
Norway 2005	1,345
Norway 2006	1,278
Norway 2007	1,32
Norway 2008	1,159
Norway 2009	1,112
Norway 2010	1,506
Norway 2011	1,3
Norway 2012	1,31
Sweden 2004	1,8
Sweden 2005	2,25
Sweden 2006	2,51
Sweden 2007	2,38
Sweden 2008	3,197
Sweden 2009	2,387
Sweden 2010	3,22
Sweden 2011	3,844
Sweden 2012	3,596

Source: Statistics from *OECD* and
Statistics Sweden.

H. Russia's democracy score 2004-2012

Table A4: Russia's democracy score 2004-2012	
2004	5,25
2005	5,25
2006	5,25
2007	4,75
2008	4,75
2009	4,75
2010	4,75
2011	4,75
2012	2,786
Freedom House Imputed Polity Democracy score. Published in the Quality of Governance institute at the University of Gothenburg 2012 standard dataset.	